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The object of this paper is to discuss the common law cases on express
warranties, in connection with the statutory definition of express war-
ranty contained in the Uniform Sales Act."
Nature of warranty and of action for breach. A warranty was
originally regarded as a representation, rather than a contract, and an
action for breach of warranty was purely a tort action.
2 In early actions
in America for breach of warranty trespass on the case was used,
3 and
recent cases indicate that the tort theory still clings to the action,
4
although assumpsit or other contract action is now at least an alternative
remedy." Certainly, however, the modern tendency is to make more
and more of the contract idea and to minimize the tort notion.
6 The
Sales Act has nothing to do with forms qf action or procedure for the
recovery of damages for breach of warranty, but that a promise or con-
tract is not necessary to a warranty under the Act is shown by the state-
ment that an "affirmation of fact" is a warranty under certain circum-
stances. The seller need not have made an offer or intended to enter
into a contract. It is sufficient that he made a statement of fact which
was justifiably relied upon by the buyer.
It is frequently said that a warranty is collateral to the main contract
of sale ;7 that is, that the warranty runs alongside but forms no part of
the agreement to pass the property in goods and p-y the price. At
common law the collateral nature of the warranty was important when
'Uniform Sales Act, sec. 12. "Definition of express warranty. Any affirma-
tion of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an express
warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the
buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon.
No affirmation of the value of the goods, nor any statement purporting to be a
statement of the seller's opinlon only shall be construed as a warranty."
*Ames, History of Assumpsit (1888) 2 HAav. L. REv. 1, 8; Chandelor v.
Lopus (i6o3, Exch. Ch.) Cro. Jac. 4.
'Seixas v. Woods (18o4, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 2 Caines, 48; Schuyler v. Russ
(I8o4,-N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 2 Caines, 202; Beenan v. Buck (1830) 3 Vt 53.
"Farrell v. Manhattan Market Co. (igog) i9 Mass. 271, 84 N. E. 481; Way v.
Martin (1891) 14o Pa. 499, 21 At. 428.
'Oneida Mfg. Soc. v. Lawrence (1825, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 4 Cow. 440; Chapman v.
Murch (1822, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) ig Johns. 290; Ingraham v. Union R. Co. (1896)
19 R- I. 356, 33 AtI. 875; Foster v. Caldwell (1846) I8 Vt. 176; Beals v. Olmstead
(1852) 24 Vt. 114; Standard Paint Ca. v. Vietor & Ca. (1917) 12o Va. 595, 91
S. E. 752.
'Millsapp v. Woolf (1911) I Ala. App. 599, 56 So. 22; Bolt v. State Say. Bank
(1915, Tex. Civ. App.) 179 S. W. 1119 (if a warranty is procured by fraud, it
may be avoided by the seller).
"Bagley v. Cleveland R. Mill Co. (1884, C. C. N. D. N. Y.) 21 Fed. i59;
Ferguson v. Johnson (1918, Tex. Civ. App.) 2o5 S. W. 512.
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the question of the survival of the warranty after acceptance of the
goods was considered. Many courts held that acceptance of the goods
barred all right to claim that the seller had not performed the main sale
contract, but did not bar the right to recover for breach of a collateral
obligation, namely, a warranty. The collateral nature of the warranty
is sometimes of practical importance in other connections." The Sales
Act has nothing to say regarding the collateral nature of the warranty
obligation and the pre-existing law on that subject will doubtless be
continued where the Act is adopted. By providing that all warranties,
express and implied, survive acceptance of the goods,9 the Act might be
said to lend force to the opinion that a warranty is a collateral obligation.
There has been some controversy in the common law cases as to
whether an express warranty can be an incident of a contract to sell
goods, a contract that the property in goods shall pass at a future date.
Some cases have held that there can be no warranty, except in connection
with a completed or consummated sale,10 but this must be deemed to
.mean that if the obligation of the seller under the main sale contract is
subject to a condition precedent which is not performed and so the
seller does not have to go on with the contract by delivery and passage
of property, there is no liability on his part on any warranty. The obli-
gation on the warranty is subject to the same condition precedent. If
the main contract falls to the ground, the collateral contract falls with it.
But this does not mean that a seller may not bind himself by a warranty
unless the property in the goods is to pass at the time of the making of
the sale contract. Other common law cases have appeared to indicate
that there can be no warranty regarding the quality of an article not in
existence," but this means that the obligation is an "implied condition,"
or part of the main sale contract, as distinguished from a collateral war-
ranty. The Sales Act calls these common law "implied conditions,"
warranties. 2 Where the point has been squarely presented whether a
warranty can arise only if the parties intended to pass property at once,
'Thus in Wills v. Wright (191I, Del. Super. Ct) 8I Atl. 507, an action for
breach of warranty was brought in the court of a Justice of the Peace. That
court had jurisdiction over contracts to deliver goods and pay money, but it
was held that it had no jurisdiction over the collateral obligation, the warranty.
In Sanderson v. Trump Mfg. Co. (913) i8o Ind. 197, lo2 N. E. 2, it was held
that the seller might recover the price without introducing evidence regarding
the warranty, the burden of proving the existence and falsity of the warranty
being on the buyer.
'See Uniform Sales Act, sec. 49.
" Osborn v. Gantz (1875) to N. Y. 540; Levis v. Pope Motor Car Co. (igii)
.202N. Y. 402, 95 N. E. 815 (semble; here the sale was subject to a condition
subsequent, and it was held that an express warranty might be an incident of
such a sale).
'Potonac Steamboat Co. v. Harlan (1886) 66 Md. 42, 4 Atl. 9o3; Cheboygan
Paper Co. v. Eichberg (igi) 184 Mich. 30, I5O N. W. 312.
'Uniform Sales Act, secs. ii and 14.
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the courts have held that a warranty and an agreement to pass property
in the future are not inconsistent. 13
It is ordinarily held that privity of contract is necessary to an obliga-
tion on a warranty,14 that such obligation can exist only between seller
and buyer, and that the seller's liability for breach of warranty does not
extend to remote buyers of the goods; that is, does not run with the
goods.15 There are, however, cases where the seller of goods has been
held liable to another than the buyer because of breach of the warranty
which was given to the buyer,'8 and also a few cases where other persons
than the seller have been held liable to the buyer for breach of war-
ranty on the basis of statements or promises regarding the goods. If
another than the seller guarantees, for a consideration, that the goods
shall possess certain qualities, he has doubtless made a valid contract,
but it is not technically a warranty. It would seem to be unsound to
hold such third person for mere affirmations of fact about the goods.
If an agent of the seller or a bystander desires to undertake on his own
behalf to guarantee the quality of the goods, there is no reason why he
may not do so, but the elements of true contract should be present. The
Sales Act, in this section and throughout, indicates that the term "war-
ranty" is to be reserved for an obligation from seller to buyer. The
contracts of third parties about the goods are not true warranties and
warranties do not run under the Act to remote vendees.
It is elementary that scienter is not necessary to an obligation to
respond for breach of warranty. The buyer does not need to prove that
the seller knew that his statements about the goods were false or that his
promises regarding their quality or capacity would not be fulfilled.' s
'Polhemus v. Heinan (1873) 45 Calif. 573; Parks v. Morris Axe & Tool Co.
(1874) 54 N. Y. 586.
"
4Roberts v. Anheuser Busch Brewing Ass'n (1912) 211 Mass. 449, 98 N. E. 95.
asBirmingham Chero-Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark (1921) 205 Ala. 678, 89 So. 64;
Hood v. Warren (1921) 2o5 Ala. 332, 87 So. 524; Drury v. Armour & Co. (191g)
14o Ark. 371, 216 S. W. 40; Welshausen v. Charles Parker Co. (1go) 83 Conn.
231, 76 Atl. 271I; Fulton Bank v. Mathers (1918) 183 Iowa, 226, I66 N. W.
1050; Booth v. Scheer (1919) 1o5 Kan. 643, 185 Pac. 898.
"Richardson Mach. Co. v. Brown (1915) 95 Kan. 685, 149 Pac. 434 (seller of
threshing machine who had warranted it held liable on the warranty to third
party whose grain was injured by defective operation of the machine) ; Mazetti
v. Armour & Co. (1913) 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (manufacturer held liable
to retailer on implied warranty, although no privity).
"
7Mobile Auto Co. v. Sturges & Co. (1914) io7 Miss. 848, 66 So. 205 (pur-
chaser of draft for price and bill of lading representing goods held a co-war-
rantor with seller) ; Hadley v. Bordo (189o) 62 Vt. 285, 19 Atl. 476 (semble;
one not seller may warrant for a consideration, but is not likely to do so);
Cooper v. Huerth (914) 156 Wis. 346, 146 N. W. 485 (agent may engage for
self that goods shall have certain qualities).
" Williamson v. Allison (i8o2, K. B.) 2 East, 446; Raft River Land & Live-
stock Co. (1917) 30 Idaho, 8o4; 168 Pac. 1O74; House v. Fort (1837, Ind.)
4 Blackf. 293 (even though form of action be tort); Dodson Fruit Co. v.
Galanter (i92o) 145 Minn. 319, 177 N. W. 362; Brisbane v. Parsons (1865) 33
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The state of the seller's knowledge regarding the facts affirmed or the
promises made is immaterial.' 9 If the seller did actually know that the
statements he made about the goods were untrue, the buyer may elect
between deceit and breach of warranty.
2
1
Form of warranty; words necessary. While in the early law the use
of the word "warrant" was necessary, and the allegation had to be
warrantizando vendidit,2 this formality has long since been dispensed
with, and it is universally held that no particular words or phrases are
necessary to constitute a warranty. 22 The use of the word "warrant,"
without reference to any particular qualities, is equivalent to an asser-
tion of general soundness.23 Sometimes the word "guaranty" is used
in the sense of "warranty ;,,24 but this is a loose use of the former word,
for it properly applies only to "an assurance of the payment of a debt
or the performance of a duty or contract by another person."25
Consideration: time of warranty. The contract nature of the war-
ranty obligation is shown by the requirement that there be consideration
for the warranty. If the warranty is made at the time of the sale, the
agreement to pay, or payment of, the price is sufficient consideration, 26
and no separate consideration for the warranty need be agreed upon .
2
If the statements of the seller were made previous to the sale, it is a
question for the trier of facts to determine whether the statements were
justifiably relied on by the buyer at the time of the making of the sale
contract or whether they were mere preliminary representations which
were set aside and superseded by.what was said and done at the time the
parties entered into the contract.28  In many cases statements made
N. Y. 332; Madden v. Graham (1918, Okla.) 174 Pac. 259; Flood v. Yeager
(1913) 52 Pa. Super. Ct 637; Beeman v. Buck, supra note 3.
' Chappell v. Boram (191I) 159 Mo. App. 442, 141 S. W. i9.
'Barnard v. Napier (1916) 167 Ky. 824, 181 S. W. 624; Barthelemy v. Foley
Elevator Co. (I919) I4W Minn. 423, 17o N. W. 513; Blair v. Hall (1918, Mo.
App.) 2Q1 S. W. 945. But if the buyer alleges fraud and breach of warranty
in the same complaint and proves the latter only, it has been held that he cannot
recover, since the gravamen of his action was fraud. Ross v. Mather (1872)
51 N. Y. io8.
'Chandelor v. Lopus, supra note 2.
'Cross v. Gardner (1689, K. B.) i Shower, 68; Medina v. Stoughton (1700,
K. B.) i Ld. Raym. 593; Polhemus v. Heiman, supra note 13; White Automo-
bile Co. v. Dorsey (1913) 11g Md. 251, 86 Atl. 6,7; Holman v. West (1919, Mo.
App.) 215 S. W. 766; Chapman v. Murch, supra note 5.
"Richardson. v. Brown (1823, C. P.) i Bing. 344.
"4Accumulator Co. v. Dubuque St. Ry. Co. (1894, C. C. A. 8th) 64 Fed., 7o;
Conkling v. Standard Oil Co. (1908) 138 Iowa, 596, I16 N. W. 822; Scott v.
Keith (19o8) 152 Mich. 547, 116 N. W. 183; State Bank v. Cape Girardeau and
Chester R. Co. (1913) 172 Mo. App. 662, 155 S. W. II1.
"Gay Oil Co. v. Roach (191o) 93 Ark. 454, 455, 125 S. W. 122, 123.
"McCauley v. Ridgewood Trust Co. (1911, Sup. Ct.) 8I N. J. L. 86, 79 Atl. 327.
" Standard Underground Cable Co. v. Denver Consol. Elec. Ca. (1896, C. C. A.
3d) 76 Fed. 422.
'Percival v. Oldacre (1865) i8 C. B. (H. s.) 398; Powers v. Briggs (1905)
139 Mich. 664, 1O3 N. W. 14; Way v. Martin (1891) i4o Pa. 499, 21 Atl. 428.
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prior to the formation of the contract have been regarded as warran-
ties,29 while in other cases it has been held that the contract was not
made with reference to such statements."0 Where the prior statements
of the seller are regarded as warranties, the assumption is that there is
an implied repetition of them at the time of the making of the contract
and that the buyer's payment of, or agreement to pay, the price forms
the consideration for the warranties.
If the statement relied on by the buyer as evidence of a warranty
was made after the making of the sale contract, proof must be made of
some new consideration, aside from the payment of, or agreement to
pay, the price.31 Such new consideration has been found where the
buyer paid the price before due,32 or accepted the goods after the failure
of the seller to deliver on time.33 If the warranty was made after the
sale, but in compliance with an understanding reached at the time of the
making of the contract, it has been held to relate back to the date of the
contract, and to be supported by the consideration of the main contract.
34
It would seem that mere acceptance of the goods, an act which the buyer
was under an obligation to perform, ought not to constitute sufficient
consideration for a warranty made after the formation of the contract
but before delivery, 5 but there is som& authority to the contrary.
38
Wilmpt v. Hord (1834, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) ii Wend. 584 (offer to warrant,
followed by sale, held warranty); Moore v. King (I89o, Sup. Ct.) 57 Hun, 224,
IO N. Y. Supp. 651 (first sale with warranty, followed by second order on same
terms); San Antonio Mach. & Supply Co: v. Josey (19o6, Tex. Civ. App.) 91
S. W. 598; Hobart v. Young (i8gi) 63 Vt. 363, 21 Ati. 612 (warranty in negotia-
tions, sale three days later) ; Milburn Wagon Co. v. Nisewarner (1894) go Va.
714, 19 S. E. 846 (warranty in catalogue furnished before sale); Winkler v.
Patten (1883) 57 Wis. 405, 15 N. W. 380 (various shipments under a single
contract).
" Carzn'c v. Warriner (3845) i C. B. 356; 'Hopkins v. Tan queray (1854) 15
C. B. I3o; Battles v. Whitley (1919) 17 Ala. App. 125, 82 So. 573; Loper v.
Lingo (igi6, Del. Super. Ct.) 97 Atl. 585 (said that warranty must be statement
"at the time of the sale') ; Martin v. Shoub (1916) 62 Ind. App. 586, 113 N. E.
384 (though seller talked of warranting); Ransberger v. Ing (1894) 55 Mo.
App. 62I (statement that shoats were sound made in notice of auction three
weeks in advance); Noble v. Buddy (1911) i6o Mo. App. 318, 142 S. W. 436;
Shull v. Ostrander (1863, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 63 Barb. 130.
.'Baldwin v. Daniel (1883) 69 Ga. 782, 791; Anderson v. Eastman (2922) 168
Ill. App. 172; Summers v. Vaughan (87) 35 Ind. 323; Farmers' Stock Breed-
ing Ass'n v. Scott (I894) 53 Kan. 534, 36 Pac. 978; Cady v. Walker (i886) 62
Mich. 157, 28 N. W. 8o5; Morehouse v. Comstock (1877) 42 Wis. 626.
'International Harv. Co. v. Haneisen (1918) 66 Ind. App. 355, 2i8 N. E. 320.
' Congar v. Chamberlain (I86I) 14 Wis. 258.
"
4 Barton Bros. v. Chicago Fire Proof Coy. Co. (19o5) 113 Mo. App. 462,
87 S. W. 599; Brown v. Nevins (1913, Sup. Ct) 84 N. J. L. 215, 86 Atl. 938.
'Fletcher Bros. v. Nelson (1896) 6 N. D. 94, 69 N. W. 53.
'Douglass v. Moses (1893) 89 Iowa, 40, 56 N. W. 271; Bowen v. Zaccanti
(igig) 2o3 Mo. App. 208, 2o8 S. W. 277; Luckes v. Meserole (19o) 132 App.
Div. 2o, 116 N. Y. Supp. 350. In Vincent v. Leland (1867) ioo Mass. 432, the
goods had been delivered, but the price had not been fixed. It was held that the
fixing of the price and the agreement to pay it constituted consideration.
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Oral or written warranty: the parol evidence rule. It is obvious that
an express warranty may be either oral or written8 7 If what is alleged
to be a warranty is in writing, the construction of it is for the court.,,
Where the evidence is oral, the existence of a warranty is for the jury,s 9
unless reasonable men could draw but one deduction.40  The buyer has
the burden of showing a warranty and its breach.
4 1
The parol evidence rule of course applies to contracts of sale as well
as other documents. Hence where a paper purports to contain all the
terms of the contract of sale, parol evidence will not be admitted to show
an express warranty,42 and, in the absence of fraud or mistake, a con-
tract containing written warranties will be conclusively presumed to
contain all the express warranties made in connection with the sale.
4
"
But where the paper is a mere memorandum or partial statement of the
contract, oral evidence will be received to show a warranty.
44
"Affirmation of fact." The reports are replete with cases where
affirmations of fact have been regarded as express warranties, and the
'Hoopes & Sons. v. Simpson Fruit Co.' (1917) i8o Iowa, 833, 161 N. W. 629.
Osgood v. Lewis (1829, Md.) 2 H. & G. 495; Brown v. Bigelow (I865, Mass.)
io Allen, 242; El Paso & Southwestern R. Co. v. Eichel (igio, Tex. Civ. App.)
130 S. W. 922.
'Van Horn v. Stautz (1921) 297 Ill. 530, 131 N. E. 153; Unland v. Garton
(1896) 48 Neb. 2o2, 66 N. W. 113o; Whitney v. Sutton (1883, N. Y. Sup. Ct)
io Wend. 411; Kime v. Riddle (1917) 174 N. C. 442, 93 S. E. 946; McAllister v.
Morgan (905) 29 Pa. Super. Ct 476.
0DeZeeuw v. Fox Chem. Co. (1920) i89 Iowa, 1195, 179 N. W. 6o5; Young v.
Vat Natta (1905) 113 Mo. App. 550, 88 S. W. 123. In Swift and Co. v. Meekins
(1920) 179 N. C. 173, 1O2 S. E. 138, an oral statement that fertilizer was as good
as any in the market was held to be a warranty as a matter of law.
"Turl's Sons Inc. v. Williams Enrg. Co. (891o) 136 App. Div. 710, 121 N. Y.
Supp. 478.
' Graham v. Eiszner (1888) 28 Ill. App. 269; Telluride Power Transm. Co. v.
Crane Co. (1904) 208 Ill. 218, 70 N. E. 319; Nichols, Shepard & Co. vt. Wyman
(887) 71 Iowa, i6o, 32 N. W. 258; Diebold Safe & Lock Co. v. Huston (1895)
55 Kan. 104, 39 Pac. 1035; Frost vt. Blanchard (1867) 97 Mass. 155; Nichols,
Shepard & Co. v. Crandall (1889) 77 Mich. 401, 43 N. W. 875; McCormick Harv.
Mach. Co. v. Thompson (189) 46 Minn. 15, 48 N. W. 415; Eighmie v. Taylor
(x885) 98 N. Y. 288; Somerville vt. Gullett Gin Co. (97) 137 Tenn. 509, 194
S. W. 576; Buchanan v. Laber (9o5) 39 Wash. 41o, 81 Pac. gi; Cooper v.
Cleghorn, (i88o) 50 Wis. 113, 6 N. W. 491.
', Wilson v. New U. S. Cattle Ranch Co. (1896, C. C. A. 8th) 73 Fed. 994;
Buckstaff v. Russell & Co. (1897, C. C. A. 8th) 79 Fed. 611; Fitch v. Woodruff
& Beach Iron Works (886o) 29 Conn. 82; United Iron Works v,. Outer Harbor
Dock & Wharf Co. (1914) 168 Calif. 81, 141 Pac. 987; Baldwint v. Daniel (1883)
69 Ga. 782; Allen v. Young (1879) 62 Ga. 617.
, "Allen v. Pink (1838, Exch.) 4 M. & W. 140; Schneider vt. Fairmon (917)
i28 Ark. 425, 194 S. W. 251; Ruff v. Jarrett (i88o) 94 Ill. 475; Jackson v. Mott
(1888) 76 Iowa, 263, 41 N. W. 12; Hitz v. Warner (Ig1i) 47 Ind. App. 612, 93
N. E. 8005; Herson v. Henderson (85o) 21 N. H. 224; Perrine v. Cooley
(0877, Sup. Ct) 39 N. J. L. 449; Filkins v. Whyland (1862) 24 N. Y. 338;
Selig v. Rehfuss (igoo) 195 Pa. 200, 45 AtI. 919; Houghton v. Carpenter (I868)
40 Vt. 588; Red Wing Mfg. Co. v. Moe (1885) 62 Wis. 240, 22 N. W. 414.
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form of a promise, warranty or guaranty has not been insisted upon.
The difficulty has been to decide whether a given statement was an
affirmation of fact or mere seller's talk or expression of opinion. In
solving this question the courts have considered the amount of knowl-
edge possessed by both parties concerning the goods, the character of
the goods, and many other points. Cases illustrating the kind of state-
ments regarded by the courts as affirmations of fact are cited below.
4 5
The affirmation must be to the buyer. A statement to a third party is
not admissible.46 And the affirmation must be definite.
47
'Riddle v. Webb (1895) iio Ala. 599, IS So. 323 (mules sound as a dollar);
Burge v. Stroberg (187I) 42 Ga. 88 (age of horse) ; Able Transfer Co. v. Win.
E. Dee Co. (19,5) 192 Ill. App. 14 (machines in satisfactory condition) ; Ryan
v. Brown (1917) 2o6 Ill. App. 534 (horse sound); Latham v. Shipley (I892)
86 Iowa, 543, 53 N. W. 342 (machine in first class order) ; Stevens v. Bradley
(1893) 89 Iowa, 174, 56 N. W. 429 (that hogs were as healthy as any seller had
ever owned); Powell v. Chittick (1893) 89 Iowa, 513, 56 N. W. 652 (hogs were
all right); Briggs v. Rumely Co. (1895) 96 Iowa, 2o2, 64 N. W. 784 (machine
as good as any other of same, size in United States) ; Aultman-Taylor Mach.
Co. v. Ridenour (18_6) 96 Iowa, 638, 65 N. W. 98o (with good management
separator is capable of doing good business) ; American Fruit Products Co. v.
Davenport (1915) 172 Iowa, 683, 154 N. W. 1O31 (that vinegar complies with
pure food laws); Merkle-Hines Mach. Co. v. Gaynor (1919) 185 Iowa, 210, 170
N. W. 381 (machine in first class condition); Vaupel v. Lamply (1914) 181
Ind. 8, 1o3 N. E. 796 (hay is good); McCarty v. Williams (1915) 58 Ind. App.
440, io8 N. E. 370 (horse sound and all right) ; Kemp v. Mays (1920) 73 Ind.
App. 236, 1:27 N. E. 156 (hogs all right); Foote v. Wilson (1919) 104 Kan. 191,
178 Pac. 43o (goods salable) ; McClintock v. Emick Stoner Co. (1888) 87 Ky.
16o, 7 S. W. 903 (mules all right); Lamme v. Gregg (1858, Ky.) I Metc. 444,
and Dickens v. Williams (1842, Ky.) 2 B. Mon. 374 (that jack is a sure foal
getter) ; Siegel v. Riebolt (191o) 1IO Minn. 344, 125 N. W. 582 (horses sound) ;
Wertheimer-Swarts Shoe Co. v. McDonald (19o9) 138 Mo. App. 328, 122 S. W. 5
(goods equal in quality to other goods of a well known kind); Detjen v.
Moerschel Brewing Co. (1911) 157 Mo. App. 614, 138 S. W. 696 (mule is straight
and all right); Richardson v. Mason (1868, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 53 Barb. 6oi (that
cows are with calf); Cook v. Mosely (1835, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 13 Wend. 277 (mare
not lame and seller would not be afraid to warrant her) ; Woolsey v. Zieglar
(1912) 32 Okla. 715, 123 Pac. 164 (cow a first class No. I Jersey); Crescent
Cotton Oil Co. v. Union Gin & Lumber Co. (1917) 138 Tenn. 58, 195 S. W. 770
("good, sound cotton seed") ; Barnum Wire & Iron Works v. Seley (1903) 34
Tex. Civ. App. 47, 77 S. W. 827 (will give you a strictly first class job, with respect
to an awning to be put up by seller); Harrell v. McDuffle (191o) 61 Tex. Civ.
App. 30, 128 S. W. 1149 ("mighty good shingles, as good as you can get any-
where"); Studebaker Bros. Co. v. Anderson (1917) 50 Utah, 319, 167 Pac. 663
(car in perfect condition for work desired); Globe Granite Co. v. Clements
(1918) 92 Vt. 383, 1O4 AtI. io4 (monument sound and free from cracks) ; Herron
v. Dibrell Bros., (1891) 87 Va. 289, 12 S. E. 674 (tobacco sound, redried and
would certainly keep) ; Smith v. Justice (1861) 13 Wis. 6oo (horse all right) ;
Milwaukee Rice Mach. Co. v. Hamacek (1902) 115 Wis. 422, 91 N. W. IOlO
(second hand machine was as good as new).
'Phillips v. Vermillion (igoo) 9I Ill. App. 133.
'
T Hogins v. Plympton (I83I, Mass.) II Pick. 97 ("good, fine wine" too indefi-
nite) ; Greer v. Whalen (915) 125 Md. 273, 93 At. 521 (heifers same as buyer
had been getting of seller sufficiently definite).
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Is descriptive matter an express warranty? The seller may execute
and deliver a bill of sale by which he passes property in "one sound,
gentle six year old horse," or he may orally agree upon the sale of a
horse before the eyes of the parties and state during the negotiations
that the horse is sound, gentle and six years old. Is there any difference
between the obligations incurred by the seller in these two cases? Are
the engagements of the seller to be called by different names? In one
the statements about the age and qualities of the horse form a part of
the description of the subject-matter of the contract, in the other trans-
action the horse is identified by the observation of the parties and the
affirmations Qbout quality and age are separate and collateral.
The majority of the courts which have considered the effect of state-
ments about the quality of goods, embodied in the description of the
subject-matter, held at common law that such statements were not
express warranties because they were not collateral to the sale contract,
but were rather a part of the main agreement to transfer the property
in goods and pay a price in exchange therefor .4  That the goods be as
described was an "implied condition,"4 9 but it was not an express war-
ranty. The Sales Act5" deduces from the description a warranty that
the goods shall conform to the description, an obligation which takes
the place of the common law "implied condition" that the goods con-
form. But in many cases descriptive statements, part and parcel of
the statement of what the subject-matter was, have been held to amount
to express warranties. 51
IAnthony v. Halstead (1877, C. P. Div.) 37 L. T. (m. s.) 433; Case Threshing
Mack. Co. v. Copren Bros. (1917) 32 Calif. App. 25o, 162 Pac. 647 (but see
Barrios v. Pac. States Trading Co. [1919] 41 Calif. App. 637, 183 Pac. 236, where
a description of the goods as "export cured boneless codfish" was held to amount
to an express warranty) ; Shainbaugh v. Current (igoo) iii Iowa, 121, 82 N. W.
497; Diebold Safe & Lock Co. v. Huston (1895) 55 Kan. 104, 39 Pac. l035;
Baird v. Mathews (1838, Ky.) 6 Dana, 129; St. Anthony & Dakota Elev. Co. v.
Princeton Roller Mill Co. (19o8) 104 Minn. 401, 116 N. W. 935; Kircher v.
Conrad (i8go) 9 Mont. 191, 23 Pac. 74; Willard v. Stevens (1849) 24 N. H. 271;
Brown v. Baird (897) 5 Okla. 133, 48 Pac. i8o; Brown v. Davidson (1914) 42
Okla. 598, 142 Pac. 387; United Iron Works Co. v. Henryetta Coal & Mining Co.
(1917) 62 Okla. 99, E62 Pac. 209; Shisler v. Baxter (1885) 1O9 Pa. 443; Jones v.
George (1884) 6I Tex. 345; Ferguson v. Johnson (1918, Tex. Civ. App.) 205
S. W. 512.
'" Reed v. Randall (1864) 29 N. Y. 358.
'Sec. 14.
"De Loach Mill Mfg. Co. v. Tutweiler Coal, Coke & Iron Co. (9o7) 2 Ga.
App. 493, 58 S. E. 790; Henshaw v. Robins (1845, Mass.) 9 Metc. 83; Edgar v.
Breck & Sons Corp. (1899) 172 Mass. 581, 52 N. E. 1O83; Putnam-Hooker Co.
v. Hewins (IgIo) 204 Mass. 426, go N. E. 983; Cavanaugh v. Ranlet Co. (1918)
229 Mass. 366, 118 N. E. 65o; Leonard v. Carleton & Hovey Co. (1918) 230
Mass. 262, 119 N. E. 674; Osgood v. Lewis, supra note 38; Alvin Fruit & Truck
Ass'n v. Hartman (igog) 146 Mo. App. 155, 123 S. W. 957; Wolcott v. Mount
(1875) 38 N. J. L. 496; Unadilla Silo Co. v. Hull & Son (1916) 90 Vt. 134,
96 Atl. 535; Hoffinan v. Dixon (19oo) 1o5 Wis. 315, 81 N. W. 491. In New
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Express warranty and other transactions distinguished. Certain
other transactions should be distinguished from the express warranty.
(i) Dealer's talk of puffs which have no legal effect.52  (2) Expres-
sions of opinion by the seller, which are likewise of no binding force.53
(3) Statements of fact made by the seller on subjects other than the
title, quality, identity, or capacity of the goods, as, for example, con-
cerning the ability of the seller to deliver the goods at a certain time.
These latter statements if made preliminarily, and not as a part of the
contract, are "representations," and may of course be false or innocent.5 4
(4) Implied warranties, obligations which the law deems the seller to
have undertaken implicitly, although they were not directly stated,55 are
of course to be distinguished from express warranties, even though
under the Sales Act their effect is identical.56 Under the common law
they often produced different results. 57  (5) The right to inspect and
reject or accept is not the right to hold the seller liable for a defect in
quality, and so not an express warranty. It is not a promise that the
goods will be such that the buyer should accept them.58 (6) Where
there is a sale on approval there is no express warranty. The buyer
has a right to test the goods and decide whether they suit him, but the
seller does not agree that they will suit the buyer.59
Warranty may consist of a promise. Although in the early common
law it was contended that a warranty must be a statement of a fact or
a warranty that a fact was true, and could not consist of a promise that
an event would come to pass or that the goods would possess certain
York the early cases and a few of the later ones declare that descriptive matter
does not amount to an express warranty. Seixas v. Woods, supra note 3;
Swett v. Colgate (1822, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 20 Johns. 196; Depew v. Peck Hardware
Co. (I9O7) 12i App. Div. 28, xo5 N. Y. Supp. 390; Levy v. Kornreich (igio, App.
Term.) i2i N.Y. Supp. 346. But the later and controlling decisions at common law
were to the effect that terms of description were to be treated as express warran-
ties: Hawkins v. Pemberton (1872) 51 N. Y. I98; White v. Miller (877) 71
N. Y. I18; Fairbank Canning Co. v. Metzger (189o) ui1 N. Y. 26o, 23 N. E. 372;
Egbert v. Hanford Produce Co. (19o4) 92 App. Div. 252, 86 N. Y. Supp. ii18;
Coleman v. Simpson Hendee & Co. (1934) i62 App. Div. 335, 147 N. Y. Supp. 865.
Stuinpp & Walker Co. v. Lynber (903, App. Term.) 84 N. Y. Supp. 912, and
cases cited infra note 121.
'Lawton v. Keil (1867, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 6I Barb. 558, and cases cited infra
note 122.
See infra notes 68-70. In Griswold v. Morrison (92) 53 Calif. App. 93, 2oo
Pac. 62, a statement that hogs were sound, made in advance of the making of
the contract, and for the purpose of inducing the buyer to buy, was said to be
a mere representation and not a warranty, because it was not a part of the
contract, but was merely made to induce the contract. This seems unsound.
'Uniform Sales Act, secs. 13-16.
'Uniform Sales Act, sec. 6g.
Coplay Iron Co. v. Pope (1888) 1O8 N. Y. 232, 15 N. E. 335; Fairbank
Canning Co. v. Metzger, supra note 5I.
'Hurlev-Mason Co. v. Stebbins (1934) 79 Wash. 366, 140 Pac. 381.
'Childs v. O'Donnell (3893) 84 Mich. 533, 47 N. W. iio8. ,
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qualities or capacities in the future,60 this distinction has long since been
abandoned. There are numerous common law cases in which promises
about the future capacity, qualities, or conduct of the goods have been
held to constitute express warranties.61 The Sales Act clearly recog-
nizes that an express warranty may be statement of fact or a promise.
The time when the warranty is required to be true, if no time is
expressly stated, has been held to be the time of delivery of the goods
or passage of the property in them. 2
"Relating to the goods." Not every statement or promise made at
the time of the sale was called a warranty according to the common law.
The statement or promise must pertain to the character or identity of
the goods,63 their age, 4 title, 5 quality,6  or, according to some authori-
o3 Blackstone, Comnentaries, *165.
' Osborn v. Nicholson (1871, U. S.) 13 Wall. 654 (that slave sold would be
slave for life) ; Birmingham Motor Co. v. Norwood (1918) 16 Ala. App. 572, 8o So.
146 (that auto chassis would run 30,000 miles); Indiana Silo Co. v. Harris
(1918) 134 Ark. 218, 203 S. W. 58, (that silo would preserve ensilage); Coats
v. Hord (1915) 29 Calif. App. 115, 154 Pac. 491 (that jack would produce colts) ;
Hackett v. Lewis (I918) 36 Calif. App. 687, 173 Pac. ii (that truck would
carry three tons) ; Modern Mach. Co. v. Perkins (1911, Del. Super. Ct.) 8o Atl.
io6o (that pumps would have certain pressure); Houghton & Co. v. Alpha
Process Co. (1915, Del. Super. Ct) 93 Atl. 669 (that belting would transmit
power desired by buyer); Iroquois Furnace Co. v. Wilkin Mfg. Co. (I899) 18I
Ill. 582, 54 N. E. 987 (that engine would be equal to any in market) ; Smith v.
Borden (19o3) i6o Ind. 223, 66 N. E. 681 (that windmill would do certain work) ;
Hitz v. Warner (1911) 47 Ind. App. 612, 93 N. E. 1OO5 (that potatoes vzould
keep) ; Smith v. Hale (1893) 158 Mass. 178, 33 N. E. 493 (that wagon would
carry certain weight) ; Skoog v. Mayer Bros. - Co. (1913) 122 Minn. 209, 142
N. W. 193 (that dredge would have certain capacity) ; Miller v. Patch Mfg. Co.
(i9o5) Ioi App. Div. 22, 91 N. Y. Supp. 870 (that derrick would hold load up
to 25o tons); Ralph Carter Co. v. Fischer (igio, App. Term.) 121 N. Y. Supp.
614 (that engine would perform work for which buyer wanted it); Hazelton
Boiler Co. v. Frago Gas & Elec. Co. (1894) 4 N. D. 365, 61 N. W. 151 (that
boiler would save 20o in fuel) ; International Harv. Co. v. Lawyer (1916) 56
Okla. 2o7, 155 Pac. 617 (that auto would operate over roads around buyer's
town); Williams v. Ingle (1921) 99 Or. 358, ig Pac. 570 (that hotel furniture
and equipment would be in good condition on delivery) ; Smith & Furbush Co.
V. Johnston (1915) 102 S. C. 130, 86 S. E. 489 (that machine would do certain
work) ; Richardson v. Grandy (1876) 49 Vt. 22 (that machine would be equal
in all respects to a new machine) ; Huntington v. Lombard (1goo) 22 Wash. 2o2,
6o Pac. 414 (would do work buyer required) ; Congar v. Chamberlain, supra. note
33 (trees sold would not be injured by the frost).
' American Syrup & Preserv. Co. v. Roberts (gio) 112 Md. 18, 76 AtI. 589.
In Pierson v. Hoag (1866, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 47 Barb. 243, it was held that where
delivery and payment were to occur at a day after the making of the warranty,
the truth or falsity of the warranty was to be judged as of the time when the
warranty was made.
" Hawkins v. Pemberton (1872) 51 N. Y. 198.
"Pennock v. Stygles (1886) 54 Vt. 226.
'Davis v. Cramer (1915) 188 Mo. App. 718, 176 S. W. 468.
'Gay Oil Co. v. Roach, supra note 25 (that barrels, on a sale of barrels and
oil therein, would not leak).
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ties, the quantity of them. 7 Thus, where goods are being sold on the
basis of original cost, a statement 'nade by the seller that the marks on
the goods show the original cost is not a warranty but rather a represen-
tation."' It was a statement which undoubtedly tended to induce the
sale, but it did not relate to identity, quality or title of the goods. It
had to do with the price which the seller had originally paid for the
goods.
There may be in connection with a sale contract a promise on the part
of the seller to perform some act regarding the goods, as for example, to
overhaul an automobile after a trip, 9 or to take back the goods, under
certain circumstances.70 These are not warranties, but rather special
and additional contracts made at the same time as the sale contract.
They do not relate to the character, quality or title of the goods, but to
some act which the seller agrees to perform with respect to the goods.
In some states there existed, prior to the Sales Act, a statutory defini-
tion of express warranty apparently broader than that of the Act."
It read: "A warranty is an engagement by which a seller assures
to a buyer the existence of some fact affecting the transaction, whether
past, present or future." According to this definition the affirmation or
promise need not necessarily refer to the quality or title of the goods,
but might relate to the financial standing of the seller or the output of
his factory.
Although the law of warranty in the field of sales properly applies
only to goods, similar principles have been followed in treating transfers
of incorporeal personal property, as, for example, notes,7 2 accounts,"
and judgments.74
Natural tendency to induce purchase: intent. The instruction of
juries concerning the state of mind which the seller must have possessed
when he made a statement, if such affirmation is to be regarded as a
warranty, has caused the courts much trouble. Some courts have held
that the seller must have intended to warrant, must have made an offer
to bind himself for the truth of his assertion, and that unless he agreed
expressly and actually to respond in damages if his statement proved
" Ruff v. Jarrett, supra note 44; Reval v. Miller (1913) 178 IIl. App. 2o8.
" Mason v. Thornton (1905) 74 Ark. 46, 84 S. W. 1O48.
' Warren v. Renault Fr~res Selling Branch (1915) 195 II. App. 117.
"Elliott Supply Co. v. Hanson (917) 39 S. D. 570, 165 N. W. 991. But in
State Nat. Bank v. Roseberry ('9'5) 46 Okla. 7o8, 148 Pac. 1034, an agreement
to make diamonds right if they were not satisfactory was held a warranty.
SN. D. Comp. Laws, 1913, sec. 5973, as construed in McCurdy v. Aylor (1918)
41 N. D. 187, 17o N. W. 523, and similar statute construed in Elliott Supply Co. v.
Hanson, supra note 70.
" Giffert v. West (1873) 33 Wis. 617.-
" Curtis v. Northwestern Bedding Co. (1913) 121 Minn. 288, 141 N. W. 161.
"'Bennett v. Buchan (1879) 76 N. Y. 386.
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untrue, he did not warrant.75 The classic statement of this doctrine
appears in the language of Gibson, C. J., in McFarland v. N~ewman,76
as follows:
"Naked averment of a fact is neither a warranty, nor evidence of it. In
connection with other circumstances, it certainly may be taken into con-
sideration; but the jury must be satisfied from the whole, that the
vendor actually, and not constructively, consented to be bound for the
truth of his representation."
This doctrine seems likely to continue to prevail in Pennsylvania 7 not-
withstanding the adoption of the Sales Act in that commonwealth and
the fact that the Act requires merely justifiable reliance by the buyer on
the seller's statement. The adoption of the Sales Act in states which
have announced this doctrine ought to work a decided change in the
instruction of juries in express warranty cases.
Other courts have perhaps meant much the same thing when they
have held that the seller must have intended the statement to be a war-
ranty "and not to have been the expressi6n of mere matter of opinionT
s
"Hopkins v. Tanqueray, supra note 30; Stucley v. Baily (1862, Exch.) i
H. & C: 405; Hartin Com!'n. Co. v. Pelt (i9o5) 76 Ark. 177, 88 S. W. 929
(semble); Sauerman v. Simmons (i9o5) 74 Ark. 563, 86 S. W. 429 (semble;
but see Cornish v. Friedman [igio] 92 Ark. 242, 126 S. W. 1079) ; Luitweiler
Pumping Engine Co. m. Ukiah Water & Imp. Co. (1911) 16 Calif. App. 198, 116
Pac. 707; Coats v. Hord, supra note 6I; Morris v. Fiat Motors Sales Co. (1916)
32 Calif. App. 315, 162 Pac. 663; Denver Suburban Homes & Water Co. v.
Fugate (917) 63 Colo. 423, 168 Pac. 33; Tyre v. Causey (1846, Del. Super. Ct.)
4 Harr. 425; Turner Bros. v. Clarke (19,5) 143 Ga. 44, 84 S. E. i6 (semble) ;
Adams v. Johnson (1845) 15 Ill. 345; Phillips v. Vermillion, supra note 46;
Central Commercial Co. v. The Lehon Co. (i86i) 173 Ill. App. 27; House v.
Fort, supra note 18; Jones v. Quick (1867) 28 Ind. 125; Bowman v. Clemmer
(875) 5o Ind. 1o; Jackson v. Wetherill (1822, Pa.) 7 Serg. & R. 48o; Wetherill
v. Neilson (1853) 20 Pa. 448; Holmes v. Tyson (1892) 147 Pa. 305, 23 AtI. 564;
Wilkinson v. Stettler (911) 46 Pa. Super. Ct. 4o7 (statement that horse was
sound, solid, all right and would work any place as matter of law not a warranty).
(1839, Pa.) 9 Watts, 55, 6o.
'
7 Walker v. Kirk (i919) 72 Pa. Super. Ct. 534, a case'apparently decided under
the Sales Act. A statement that a mare was sound was held as a matter of law
not to be a warranty. But apparently the use of the word "warrant" is not
necessary under the Pennsylvania rule. Armstrong v. Descaizi (I91) 48 Pa.
Super. Ct. 171.
'
3 Matlock v. Meyers (1877) 64 Mo. 531, 533 (italics ours) ; Anthony v. Potts
(I895) 63 Mo. App. 517; Boston v. Alexander (1914) 185 Mo. App. 16, i71
S. W. 582; Unland v. Garton, supra note 39; Phillips v. Crosby (1904) 70
N. 3. L. 785, 59 At. 142; Swett v. Colgate, supra note 51; Whitney v. Sutton,
supra note 39; Titus v. Poole (1895) 145 N. Y. 414, 40 N. E. 228; Money v.
Fisher (I895, Sup. Ct.) 92 Hun, 347, 36 N. Y. Supp. 862; Beeman v. Buck,
supra note 3; Foster v. Caldwell, supra note 5; Bond v. Clark (1863) 35 Vt. 577;
Houghton v. Carpenter (1868) 40 Vt 588; Beals v. Olmstead, supra note 5;
Drew v. Ellison (1888) 6o Vt. 401, 15 Atl. oo (statement must have been intended
by parties as basis of the sale); Enger & Co. v. Dawley & Co. (i89o) 62 Vt.
164, i9 AtI. 478 (parties must have intended that representations be warranties,
or a part of the contract, or the basis of the contract).
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The views of the courts in this class of cases are illustrated by a state-
ment from an opinion of Kent, as follows: "To make an affirmation at
the time of a sale, a warranty, it must appear by evidence to be so
intended, and not to have been a mere matter of judgment and
opinion." 79
In still other decisions the courts have stated the requirement to be
that the seller intend to state a fact and not merely to give an opinion.8 0
In yet other cases it has been said that the seller must have intended
to induce the sale by his statement,8 ' or must have made his affirmation
with the intent that the buyer rely upon it in making the purchase.
8 2
As contrasted with these cases which place emphasis on the state of
the seller's mind at the time he made the assertion about the goods, are
" Seixas v. Woods, supra note 3, at p. 55.
S'Ransberger v. Ing, supra note 30; Chapman v. Murch, supra note 5; Erwin
v. Maxwell (1819) 7 N. C. 241; Foggart v. Blackweller (1844) 26 N. C. 238
(notion that justifiable belief of buyer js sufficient, not approved) ; Beasley v.
Surles (19o6) 14o N. C. 6o5, 53 S. E. 36o (intent of seller and understanding of
buyer both important); Hodges v. Smith (1912) 158 N. C. 256, 259, 73 S. E.
807, 808 ("This is but the statement of the general rule that in order to make a
contract the minds of the parties must agree upon the same thing, the intention
or belief of one only not being sufficient for the purpose. The intention of both
must be the same") ; see also Tomlinson & Co. v. Morgan (1914) 166 N. C. 557,
82 S. E. 953, but see Wrenn v. Morgan (i9o8) 148 N. C. IOI, 61 S. E. 641, where
the intent of the seller which the buyer was reasonably entitled to presume
existed is said to be the important question. Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Union
Gin & Lumber Co., supra note 45; Cole v. Carter (19oo) 22 Tex. Civ. App. 457,
54 S. W. 914; Harrell v. McDuflie, supra note 45; Hobart v. Young, supra note
29; Mason v. Chappell (186o, Va.) 15 Gratt. 572.
'American Fruit Product Co. v. Davenport Vinegar & Pickling Wks. (1915)
172 Iowa, 683, 154 N. W. 1O31; Stanley v. Day (igg) 185 Ky. 362, 215 S. W.
175; Osgood v. Lewis, supra note 38 (semble) ; Crenshaw v. Slye (1879) 52
Md. 140, 146 (and "intended as .an assurance of the fact stated"); Potomac
Steamboat Co. v. Harlan (1886) 66 Md. 42, 46, 4 At. 903, 9o5 ("intended to
operate on the mind of a vendee as an inducement to make a purchase") ; White
Automobile Co. v. Dorsey, supra note 22; Greer v. Whalen, supra note 47;
Siegel v. Riebolt, supra note 45; Young v. Van Natta, supra note 4o; Wer-
theimer-Swarts Shoe Co. v. McDonald, supra; note 45; Woolsey v. Zieglar, supra
note 45; Madden v. Graham, supra note i8; Frey v. Failes (1913) 37 Okla. 297,
132 Pac. 342; ' ler v. Jennings (191o) 87 S. C. 87, 68 S. E. 1O41; Waterbury v.
Russell (i874,,Tenn.) 8 Baxt. i59. But in St., Louis Cordage Mills v. Western
Supply Co.- (1916) 54 Okla. 757, 154 Pac. 646, it was held that it was necessary
only that the seller make a positive representation relating to a matter of fact
and that it be relied upon; and in International Hdr. Co. v. Lawyer, supra note
6I, it was held that the only intent required was that of the seller to assert a
fact of which the buyer is ignorant.
'Four Traction Auto Co. v. Hurni (1912) 156 Iowa, 725, 137 N. W. 1014;
Lamme v. Gregg, supra note 45; Alvit Fruit & Truck Assn v. Hartman, supra
note 51; Laumeier v. Dolph (I9IO) 130 S. W. 36o, 145 Mo. App. 78; Detien v.
Moerschel Brewing Co., supra note 45; Chappell v. Boram, supra note ig;
Blair v. Hall, supra note 20; Holman v. West, supra note 22; Tenney v. Cowles
(1887) 67 Wis. 594, 31 N. W. 221.
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a number of cases in which it is denied that the seller's intent is
germane. The important question is, say the courts in these decisions,
What was the buyer justified in believing? That this statement was
mere chaffing -or personal opinion, or that it was put forward as an
assertion of fact which the buyer might depend upon in promising to
take title and pay the price ?8 Earle, C., in Hawkins v. Pemberton 4
stated the case as follows:
"It is not true, as sometimes stated, that the representation, in order to
constitute a warranty, must have been intended by the vendor, as well
as understood by the vendee, as a warranty. If the contract be in writ-
ing and it contains a clear warranty, the vendor will not be permitted
to say that he did not intend what his language clearly and explicitly
declares; and so if it be by parol, and the representation as to the
character or quality of the article sold be positive, not mere matter of
opinion or judgment, and the vendee understand it as a warranty and
he relies upon it and is induced by it, the vendor is bound by the war-
ranty, no matter whether he intended it to be a warranty or not. He
is responsible for the language he uses, and cannot escape liability by
claiming that he did not intend to convey the impression which his
language was calculated to produce upon the mind of the vendee."
The Sales Act adopts the view put forth in these latter cases and
stresses the natural tendency of the seller's statements, and the actual
' Van Horn v. Stauta, supra note 39 (intention to warrant or justifiable belief
by buyer that seller intended to warrant necessary. Sale occurred in September,
1918, but Sales Act not mentioned by court); Conkling v. Standard Oil Co.,
supra note 24; Foote v. Wilson, supra note 45; McClintock v. Emick, Stoner
& Co., supra note 45, at p. 166, 7 S. W. at p. 905 ("It does not depend- upon
whether the vendor intends to be bound by his warranty or not, but upon whether
he made an affirmation as to the condition of the article or merely expressed an
opinion as to it") ; Stroud v. Pierce (1863, Mass.) 6 Allen, 413; Spencer Heater
Co. v. Abbott (1918) 91 N. J. L. 594, 596, io4 Atl. 91, 92 ("Now, the question
whether or not a statement or affirmation accompanying a sale is a warranty
depends upon whether the conditions were such that the vendee had a right to
understand, 'and did understand, that what was said by the vendor was meant
as a warranty"); Ingraham v. Union Railroad Co., supra note 5; Reese v.
Bates (1897) 94 Va. 321, 330, 26 S. E. 865, 869 ("It is true that there can be no
warranty, unless the parties intend to warrant; that is to say, in the contract -
of warranty there must be an agreement of the minds of the contracting parties
as in all other contracts ..... .Every man is presumed to intend the conse-
quences of his own act. When, therefore, a vendor in negotiating a sale makes
an affirmation of quality as an assurance of fact which is relied on by the buyer
it constitutes a warranty, for the vendor will be presumed to have so intended") ;
Huntington v. Lombard, supra note 61; Northwestern Lumber Co. v. Callendar
(1904) 36 Wash. 492, 79 Pac. 30; Smith v. Justice, supra note 45, at p. 603
("It is true, the question to be arrived at in construing every agreement is the
intention of the parties. But each party is bound by such intention as his
language in making the agreement indicates. And he cannot use language there
showing one intention, and then avoid its effect by leaving to the jury the question
whether he really intended it or not").
8
"Supra note 63, at p. 202. Accord: Fairbank Canning Co. v. Metzger, supra
note 5i; Fiss, Doerr & Carroll Horse Co. v. Schwartzchild (19io, App. Term.)
121 N. Y. Supp. 292.
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effect on the buyer. Both natural tendency and actual effect must exist.
Even if the seller's statement would lead an ordinary man into reliance
in making the purchase, the statement is not a warranty, unless the
buyer in question actually relied. And actual reliance by this particular
buyer on what the seller said will not make the affirmation a warranty,
unless the natural tendency of the statement in question was to lead
the buyer into the purchase. The buyer may have been unreasonable in
his conduct and foolishly trusted to a mere puff as an assurance of the
quality of the goods.
In cases where the seller's intent has been stressed there are some
discussions regarding the evidence necessary to show that the seller had
the requisite intent. The use of the word "warrant" by the seller has
been held sufficient proof of an intent to warrant."5 An affirmation
regarding the title to goods has been held to be conclusively presumed
to be intended as a statement of fact and not an opinion. 6 Where the
buyer states the purpose for which he is buying the article and the
seller then makes a remark regarding the fitness of the article for that
purpose, intent to warrant has been found, 7 especially if there is no
opportunity for inspection and the seller has personal knowledge about
the goods and the buyer has no knowledge.88 If the seller strikes out
the warranty clause from a bill of sale, it is of course strong evidence
of an intent not to warrant.89 Even in the common law cases which
required that the seller intend to warrant, it has been said occasionally
that presumed or constructive intent to warrant was enough. "If a
party uses language which imports a warranty, the presumption is that
he intends it as such." 90  It seems better to abandon all discussion of
what the seller thought and intended, leave the realm of fiction and
construction, and rest the decision on what the buyer was justified in
thinking.
Purchase of goods in reliance on warranty. The common-law cases
lay down the rule that, in order to obligate the seller, there must be
reliance by the buyer on the warranty.0 ' If the buyer relied wholly on
'Davis v. Berkheimer (1911) 152 Iowa, 270, 132 N. W. 377.
'Davis v. Cramer, supra note 65.
'Burns v. Limerick (1914) 178 Mo. App. 145, 151, 165 S. W. 1166, 1169 ("It
is not the secret intent the seller may have in his mind that governs, but it is the
legal intent, or the intention which the law affixes to what is said and done, that
determines the question of warranty or no warranty").
'Beals v. Olmstead, supra note 5. And so, too, where the buyer tells the
seller he intends to rely on the seller's statements in making the purchase. Drew
v. Ellison, supra note 78.
' Smith v. Bank of South Carolina (1837, S. C.) Riley Ch. 113.
"Bryant v. Crosby (1855) 40 Me. 9, ig.
"Landman v. Bloomer (1897) 117 Ala. 312, 23 So. 75; Hackett v. Lewis (1918)
36 Calif. App. 687, 173 Pac. iii; Dietrich v. Badders (1913, Del. Super. Ct)
go AtI. 47; Hawkins v. Berry (1848) 1o Ill. 36 (but see Phillips v. Verinillion,
supra note 46); Stanley v. Day, supra note 81. The Indiana cases seem to lay
little stress on reliance. Shordan v. Kyler (1882) 87 Ind. 38; McCarty v. Wil-
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his own judgment or that of someone else than the seller, then the buyer
can scarcely be said to have paid or agreed to pay for the seller's war-
ranty of the quality or title, and there cannot be said to have been a
contract that the seller would respond in damages if the goods failed in
quality or title.
But it is not necessary that the warranty of the seller was the sole
inducement to the purchase, or that the buyer trusted entirely to the
seller's warranty in taking the goods. The buyer may have inspected
as well as he could and formed an opinion and relied partly on his own
judgment and partly on the affirmation of the seller.
9 2
Reliance should be pleaded by the buyer who sets up a warranty,
9 3
but it has been said that its existence will be presumed where the war-
ranty is part of the contract of sale. 4 The buyer may testify directly
that he relied on the seller's statement as a warranty,
95 but this is not
necessary; the jury-may find reliance from all the facts of the case,
without testimony of the buyer that he relied. 96 An important fact in
determining reliance is the amount of knowledge regarding the goods
possessed by both parties.97 If the buyer knows as much of the goods
as does the seller, and the buyer does not testify that he relied on the
seller's statements, the jury will be justified in finding no reliance.
9 8
That the goods were second-hand, and therefore might be expected to
be somewhat worn or defective, does not necessarily show that there was
no reliance by the buyer.9 9 Statements by the seller to third parties
about the goods are not warranties. 00 Not only is there no justifiable
reliance by the buyer on them as warranties, but it is not their natural
tendency to induce a purchase by another than the persons to whom
the remarks were made.
Lack of reliance is shown where the buyer states that he is buying a
second-hand plow "for what it is worth ;,,101 or affirms that he knows of
liams, supra note 45. In Smith v. Reed (igio) 141 Wis. 483, 124 N. W. 489, it
was held that if the warranty is in express terms, it is not necessary to show
reliance.
'Keely v. Turbeville (1883, Tenn.) ii Lea, 339.
"Feeney & Bremer Co. v. Stone (1918) 89 Or. 360, 171 Pac. 569. But in
Williams v. Ingle, supra note 61, it was held that if the warranty was a promise
regarding the future condition of the goods, and not the statement of a present
fact, reliance need not be pleaded. This seems unsound.
" Merkle-Hines Mach. Co. v. Gaynor, supra note 45.
' Milwaukee-Rice Mach. Co. v. Hamacek, supra note 45.
"Smith v. Hale, supra note 61; Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. McKinnon (1goo)
82 Minn. 75, 84 N. W. 646.
"Schmidt v. Jutting (1913) 31 S. D. 69, 139 N. W. 769.
"Baker v. Henderson (1869) 24 Wis. 5o9.
Walker, Evans & Cogswell Co. v. Ayer (1go8) 8o S. C. 292, 61 S. E. 557.
"' Lindsey v. Lindsey (1857) 34 Miss. 432; William Wurdack Elect. Mfg. CO.
v. Elliott & Barry Eng. Co. (1919, Mo. App.) 207 S. W. 877.
1Jones v. Arnstrong (mi5) 5o Mont. 168, 145 Pac. 949.
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his own knowledge that the goods are sound ;"o2 or investigates for him-
self ;"o" or tests a horse himself and employs a veterinarian to do like-
wise. 04
Inspection or opportunity for inspection: reliance. If the buyer
receives a warranty of the title or quality of the goods he is under no
duty to inspect the goods or make an investigation regarding them, for
the purpose of finding out whether the warranty is true or false.10 5
One of the objects of taking the warranty is to save the buyer the
trouble of making such inspection or investigation and the risk of rely-
ing wholly upon the information thus obtained. The seller is not
relieved from his warranty because the buyer might, by diligent search,
have discovered that the warranty was false and ought not to be relied
upon.
Neither the oplportunity for inspection,0 6 nor actual inspection,'10 7
necessarily shows that the buyer did not rely in part or wholly'on the
seller's statements; but of course, as previously indicated, an inspection
by the buyer, especially if he be a competent judge of the goods, is
evidence tending to show lack of reliance. 09
Defect visible: reliance. A "visible defect" in the law of express
warranties means one which would be observed by an ordinary observer,
possessing no particular skill, and therefore presuxmed to have come to
the attention of the buyer; or a defect which was shown actually to
have come to the notice of the buyer before the making of the contract,
no matter how easy or difficult to detect it might be.109 A defect is not
' Lindsey v. Lindsey, supra note IOO.
' Crocker-Wheeler Co. v. Johns-Pratt Co. (1898) 29 App. Div. 300, 51 N. Y.
Supp. 793, affirmed (19oo) 164 N. Y. 593, 58 N. E. io86.
"' Smith v. Reed, supra note 91.
'°Morris v. Fiat Motors Sales Co. (igi6) 32 Calif. App. 315, 162 Pac. 663;
Raft River Land & Livestock Co. v. Laird, supra note 18; First Nat. Bank v.
Grindstaff (1873) 45 Ind. I58t Meickley v. Parsons (x885) 66 Iowa, 63, 23 N. W.
265; Vaupel v. Lamply, supra note 45.
'" Hitz v. Warner, supra note 61; Lichtenstein v. Rabolinsky (19o4) 98 App.
Div. 516, 9o N. Y. Supp. 247; Woolsey v. Zieglar, supra note 45; Klock v.
Newbury (1911) 63 Wash. 153, 114 Pac. 1032.
" Sinith v. Hale, supra note 96; Young v. Van Natta, supra note 4o; Woods v.
Thompson (1905) 114 Mo. App. 38, 88 S. W. 1126; Oak Lawn Sugar Co. v.
Sparks Bros. Mule Co. (ig1) 159 Mo. App. 496, 141 S. W. 698; Frey v. Failes,
supra note 81; Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Union Gin & Lumber Co., supra
note 45.
"'Barnett v. Stanton (1841) 2 Ala. 181; Stanley v. Day, supra note 81.
X0*Birdseye v. Frost (i861, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 34 Barb. 367. Hairlines, checks
and discolorations of the keys of a piano were held not to be visible defects in
Risser v. Cox (1919) 187 Iowa, 99o, 174 N. W. 701. In Degenhardt v. Billings
(191o) 33 Ohio C. C. 232, a defect discovered after delivery and the passage
of property and the giving of the warranty seems to have been regarded as a
"visible defect," so as to prevent the buyer from recovering damages for injuries
sustained in using the goods after such discovery. This seems erroneous. The
time of the making of the contract determines the visibility of the defect.
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visible if an unusual process of investigation is necessary to discover it,
as, for example, the stripping of a slave.110 Nor is the defect visible
where the seller creates conditions which render it impossible to observe
the defect, as where the seller keeps the horse in a dark stable, with
his ankles buried in straw."1 1
It is a well known common law doctrine in the law of warranty that
a general warranty does not cover obvious defects. 112  If the seller
states that the horse is sound, and both parties have observed and talked
about the blindness of the horse in one eye, the law assumes that they
intended to make an exception of this known defect, and that the war-
ranty meant sound, except for the blindness in one eye. It is a natural
and reasonable conclusion that the buyer did not rely on this general
warranty as a statement by the seller that the horse had two good eyes,
but rather consented to take the horse with the defective eye and with a
corresponding deduction in the purchase price.
If, however, a quality or condition of the goods is noted, the effect or
nature of which is uncertain, a general warranty of soundness will
cover this condition.112 Here it is not known whether the characteristic
is a defect of a permanent character or not, and thus there is a reliance by
the buyer and the natural tendency of the statement is to induce a pur-
chase. Thus, where blemishes of an uncertain nature hre observed by
the parties on the legs of a horse, a general warranty will protect the
buyer.'1 4 In the last cited case the court said :-15
"The rule excluding from a warranty such defects as are known to the
purchaser, only applies to such as are perfectly obvious to the senses,
and the effects and consequences of which may be accurately estimated,
so that no purchaser would expect the seller to warrant against them."
If the seller gives a particular warranty against some specific defect,
obviously the buyer has no protection (unless by implied warranty)
against another particular defect, whether known or unknown. Thus,
if a seller warrants a horse as good for driving, but states that she will
"10 Thompson v. Bertrand (1862) 23 Ark. 730.
' Kenner v. Harding (1877) 85 Ill. 264.
'2Marshall v. Drawhorn (1859) ,7 Ga. 275; President of Connersville v.
Wadleigh (1844, Ind.) 7 Blackf. 1O2; Dean v. Morey (1871) 33 Iowa, r2o;
McCormick v. Kelly (1881) 28 Minn. 135, 9 N. W. 675; Doyle v. Parish (19o5)
nio Mo. App. 470, 85 S. W. 646; Leavitt v. Fletcher (188o) 6o N. H. 182;
Schuyler v. Russ, supra note 3; Mulvaney v. Rosenberger (1852) Is Pa. 203;
Long v. Hicks (1841, Tenn.) 2 Humph. 305; Williams v. Ingram (1858) 21 Tex.
3oo. But see Butterfield v. Burroughs (1705, Q. B.) I Salk. 211.
,U3 Thompson v. Harvey (1889) 86 Ala. 519, 5 So. 825; Brown & Co. v.
Mathews (1915) 14 Ala. App. 428, 70 So. 287; Huston v. Plato (1877) 3 Colo.
402; Chadsey v. Greene (1856) 24 Conn. 562; Storrs v. Emerson (1887) 72
Iowa, 390, 34 N. W. 176; Brownp v. Bigelow, supra note 38; Fisher v. Pollard
(1859, Tenn.) 2 Head, 314.
"t'Hill v. North (1861) 34 Vt. 604.
"'Ibid. at p. 615.
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not stand hitched, the latter specific defect is not covered by the
particular warranty given." 6
If the goods have a known defect, the seller may specifically warrant
the goods against the effects of this defect, and this particular warranty
will of course give the buyer a cause of action if the defect proves
different from that guaranteed. 1 7  Thus, if a buyer observes a puff on
a horse's leg and the seller assures him that it is a temporary condition
and will soon disappear, there is a warranty against serious, permanent
weakness of the leg and such warranty is broken when the horse is
proved to have a spavin."81 Here very clearly the buyer relies on the
seller's statement that an uncertain or equivocal condition will not be
detrimental to the goods. The seller's engagement is practically that
the observed condition is not a defect.
Affirmations of value. The Sales Act provides that affirmations of
value shall, as a matter of law, be regarded as expressions of opinion
only and not as warranties. This seems to be out of accord with the
common law rule, which was that statements regarding the value of the
goods sold might be warranties, and that it was for the trier of facts to
determine whether the buyer justifiably relied on the statement as one
of fact. In some cases the jury or court found that the assertion about
how much the goods were worth was meant and understood as an
expression of opinion only," 9 while in other cases the buyer was held
to have been justified in believing that the seller was asserting a fact on
which, the buyer might rely in making the purchase and hence that the
statement was a warranty. 120  The value of goods, what they will bring
on sale or what they are worth for use, is, of course, in many cases a
" Knoepker v. Ahman (io3) 99 Mo. App. 30, 72 S. W. 483.
"Perdue v. Harwell (1888) 8o Ga. 15o, 4 S. E. 877; Hansen v. Gaar (895)
63 Minn. 94, 65 N. W. 254; Branson v. Turner (883) 77 Mo. 489; Samuels v.
Guim's Estate (1892) 49 Mo. App. 8; Watson v. Roode (1890) 30 Neb. 264, 46
N. W. 491; Whitney v. Sutton, supra note 39; McAfee v. Meadows (19o3) 32
Tex. Civ. App. 105, 75 S. W. 813; Norris v. Parker (1896) i5 Tex. Civ. App.
117, 38 S. W. 259; Hill v. North, supra note 1i4.
x" Fitzgerald v. Evans (1892) 49 Minn. 541, 52 N. W. I43.
'Nissen v. Applebaum (1913, App. Term.) i42 N. Y. Supp. 303 (that business
would do $iooo worth of business a month) ; Tenney v. Cowles, supra note 82
(statement regarding the cost, value and amount of a stock of goods). In
Linn v. Gunn (1885) 56 Mich. 447, 23 N. W. 84, it was held that statements
regarding the value of a stock of goods are not warranties, in the absence of
an express or implied promise to make good such representations. In Polan v.
Brownell (1881) 131 Mass. 138, statements regarding value were held not to
be a basis for an action of deceit. In Oneal v. Weisman (igo5) 39 Tex. Civ.
App. 592, 88 S. W. 29o, statements relating to the value of land were treated as
mere opinions.
'"Foote v. Wilson, supra note 45 (that goods would invoice at $9,ooo to$io,ooo); Titus v. Poole (895) 145 N. Y. 414, 40 N. E. 228 (that stock was
worth par); McKinnon v. McIntosh (1887) 98 N. C. 89, 3 S. E. 84o (that
fertilizer was worth $38 a ton). In Crenshaw v. Slye, supra note 81, a state-
ment that a fetilizer was a "valuable fertilizer" was treated as a warranty.
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matter of personal judgment about which one party can form an opinion
as well as the other; but, on the other hand, the facts which give the
goods value may be peculiarly within the knowledge of the seller so that
his assertions regarding value may well be relied on by the buyer. But
such assertions do not relate to the character, quality or title of the
goods. They relate to the price which could be obtained on a resale, or
the benefit which will be derived from the goods if consumed or used.
For this latter reason they might reasonably be regarded as representa-
tions, and not as warranties, if they were in fact anything more than
expressions of opinion, guesses, or dealer's talk.
Puffs ad opinions. Two classes of statements are clearly not war-
ranties, either at common law or under the Act. The first of these
classes consists of that vague, enticing chatter indulged in by some sales-
men in order to get the prospective buyer into a purchasing frame of
mind. The buyer is told that the goods are "the best in the market,"
"the finest thing there is for the money," "the greatest bargain I have
offered in months," and so forth. These statements are patently not
assertions of facts, or even expressions of opinion, but merely "puffs"
or "dealer's talk." No one would be justified in relying on them as
having any legal effect, and the common law cases treat them as of no
consequence.
2 1
The second class of statements which do not bind the seller or make
him a guarantor of their truth are opinions. If the trier of facts finds
that the assertion in question was given and understood, or was given
and should have been understood, as an expression of the seller's judg-
ment or opinion only, it will necessarily find that there was no warranty
and no responsibility by the seller for the falsity of judgment or opinion.
There are numerous examples among the common law cases of holdings
that statements of opinion by the seller are not warrantiesY.
22
IZ Texas Star Flour Mills Co. v. Moore (igio, C. C. W. D. -Mo.) 77 Fed. 744
("good wheat") ; Berman, v. Woods & Co. (188i) 38 Ark. 351; James & Co.
v. Bocage & Co. (885) 45 Ark. 284 (machine nearly as good as new and in
good working order) ; Alexander v. Stone (i9i6) 29 Calif. App. 488, 156 Pac.
998 (woolen goods "first class," both parties experts) ; Washburn-Crosby Co. v.
Kindervatter (191I) 147 App. Div. 114, 131 N. Y. Supp. 871 (that flour pre-
viously used would not be "in it" with that sold) ; Worrell v. Kinnear Co. (i9o5)
103 Va. 719, 49 S. E. 499 (that bid for manufacturing doors was as low as the
work could be done). In Morley v. Consolidated Mfg. Co. (19o7) 196 Mass. 257,
8r N. E. 993, the fact that the automobile sold was disposed of at half the price
of a new car was given weight in leading the court to the conclusion that the
seller's statement that the machine was in "first class condition" was one of
opinion only.
.Jendwine v. Slade (1797, N. P.) 2 Espin. 572 (name of artist in catalogue
as affirmation regarding authorship of painting. But see Power v. Barhara
[1836, K. B.] 4 Ad. & E. 473, where an opposite decision was reached on similar
facts) ; Schroeder v. Trubee (1888, C. C. D. Conn.) 35 Fed. 652 (that dividends
had been earned and stock was all right) ; Crosby v. Emerson (1913, C. C. A. 3d)
I42 Fed. 713 (regarding the value and prospects of mining property) ; Farrow v.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
The Sales Act states the common law rule regarding opinions, but
makes no mention of "dealer's talk," either upon the theory that its lack
of legal effect is too obvious for mention, or because "puffs" are regarded
as the weakest form of opinions and so covered by the rule regarding
opinions.
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Andrews & Co. (i8gi) 69 Ala. 96 (that subject of sale was good fertilizer);
Shiretzki v. Kessler & Co. (1904, Ala.) 37 So. 422 (that goods would meet the
requirements of buyer's trade) ; Ragsdale v. Shipp (1899) io8 Ga. 817, 34 S. E.
167 (that mule had shipping cold and would be all right in few days) ; Roberts
v. Applegate (1894) 153 111. 21o, 38 N. E. 676 (that young and untried stallion
would make his mark as a foal-getter); Towell v. Gatewood (184o) 3 Ill. 22
(that tobacco was "good first and second rate tobacco"); Carondelet Iron
Works v. Moore (1875) 78 Ill. 65 (that iron was "mill iron") ; Farris v. Alfred
(1912) i71 Ill. App. i72 (that auto sold to mail-carrier would give swifter and
better service than horse) ; De Zeeuw v. Fox Chem. Co., supra note 40 (that
worm powder would improve physical condition of hogs); Bryant v. Crosby,
supra note 9o (that sheep would shear certain quantity of wool); Worth v.
McConnell (1880) 42 Mich. 473, 4 N. W. 198 (threshing machine a very good
machine and would do very nice work) ; Littlejohn v. Sample (1912) x73 Mich.
419, 139 N. W. 38 (that mare was with foal when was impossible to tell but was
ground to believe she was) ; Matlock v. Meyers, supra note. 78 ("a good mare") ;
Bates County Bank v. Anderson (i9oo) 85 Mo. App. 351 ("jack is hound to be
a good breeder") ; Washburn-Crosby Co. v. Kindervatter, supra note 121 ("flour
would be as good as any flour made") ; St. Hubert Guild v. Quinn (1909, App.
Term.) 64 Misc. 336, II8 N. Y. Supp. 582 (books very fine reading matter and
fit for everybody to read) ; League Cycle Co. v. Abralza,ns (i899, App. Term.)
27 Misc. 548, 58 N. Y. Supp. 3o6 (article "unsurpassed and unsurpassable");
Fiss, Doerr & Carroll Horse Co. v. Schwartschild, supra note 84 (horse well
broken, single or double, and would fill the bill) ; Ginsberg v. Lawrence (igio,
App. Term.) 121 N. Y. Supp. 337 (that second hand sewing machine was in
very good condition); Osborne v. McCoy (i8go) 107 N. C. 726, 12 S. E. 383
(horse soufid as far as seller knew) ; Sockian v. Keim (19o9) 19 N. D. 317,
124 N. W. 64 (for all that I know mare is as healthy as the others) ; Carver-
Shadbolt Co. v. Loch (1915) 87 Wash. 453, 151 Pac. 787 (that hay-stacker would
stack hay at fifty cents a ton cheaper than another definite stacker) ; Smith v.
Bolster (912) 70 Wash. I, 125 Pac. io22 (that second hand auto, being sold at
79% cost of new machine, would run eleven miles on a gallon of gasoline, was
in first class condition and as good as any new car). Where the fact asserted
is obviously not possible of accurate knowledge, an opinion only is obviously
understood. White v. Stelloh (1889) 74 Wis. 435, 43 N. W. 99 (seller repre-
sented three months old bull calf to be good for breeding purposes). State-
ments made by a seller after he has expressly asserted that he would not warrant
the goods have been held as a matter of law to be mere opinions (Lynch v.
Curf,'an [1896] 65 Minn. 17o, 68 N. W. 5); but in another case in a similar
situation the question of warranty- was left to the jury (Moorhead v. Minneapolis
Seed Co. [1917] 139 Minn. 1I, 165 N. W. 484), where the seller's letterhead
contained a statement that no warranties would be made, but the seller expressly
said that the seed sold would germinate.
' In Worrell v. Kinnear Co., supra note 121, for example, opinions and dealer's
talk seem to be regarded as equivalent.
